Sombras de apóstatas
Domingo, Março 26, 2006
O novo livro de Francis Fukuyama,-AFTER THE NEOCONS: Where the Right Went Wrong - foi recenseado este Domingo, no Sunday Times.
"A celebrated New Yorker cartoon of the 1950s showed a plane crashing on a runway. As everyone rushed to rescue the crew, a solitary scientist walked in the opposite direction. He sighed, “Oh well, back to the drawing board.”
As George Bush’s Iraq adventure smoulders on the Tarmac, a small group of neo-cons are starting to escape the scene with varying degrees of dignity. Some, such as Paul Wolfowitz and Paul Bremer, have vanished. A handful, including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Tony Blair, remain in denial, parroting the Vietnam line: “We are winning, really.” Others, such as Francis Fukuyama, have a more valid licence to recant, having doubted whether neo-conservatism was relevant to Iraq all along.
In a devastating resumé of the saga so far, Fukuyama concludes that the so-called creation of democracy in Iraq cannot “justify the blood and treasure that the United States has spent on the project”. The war has not worked. In any counter-terrorism operation, “successful pre-emption depends on the ability to predict the future accurately and on good intelligence, which was not forthcoming”. The Bush doctrine “is now in a shambles”. America is asisolated as never before. The chaos in Iraq is spoiling the case for any further global projection of American values. More Americans than at any time since the end of Vietnam are now saying that America “should mind its own business”.
"Fukuyama is intrigued by how this disaster came about. He rehearses the often-told story of the early neocons, born of a mixture of Zionism, oil imperialism and honest evangelism for democracy. Among the many ironies was their neo-conservatives’libertarian aversion to state power at home yet anenthusiastic belief in its legitimacy and efficacy abroad when deployed against foreigners"
"Fukuyama writes clear prose and is a pleasure to read. Nor is he chary of offering advice. His old creed is now discredited, “indelibly associated with coercive regime change, unilateralism and American hegemony”. A new international order, he says, can only be promoted by peaceful persuasion through international institutions so derided by the neo-cons. While no friend of the United Nations, he preaches “multi-multilateralism”. America must move forward through “its ability to shape international institutions”, not sideline them"
A propósito do livro de Francis Fukuyama e ainda sobre estes assuntos que lidam com erros e enganos, valerá a pena citar aqui, outro enganado pelo tempo que entretanto passou: Robert McNamara, um dos grandes arquitectos da guerra do Vietname e que não hesitou em publicar em 1995, uma crónica desses enganos, num livro que intitulou -In Retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam. Um excerto:
"Two developments after I became secretary of defense reinforced my way of thinking about Vietnam: the intensification of relations between Cuba and the Soviets, and a new wave of Soviet provocations in Berlin. Both seemed to underscore the aggressive intent of Communist policy. In that context, the danger of Vietnam's loss and, through falling dominoes, the loss of all Southeast Asia made it seem reasonable to consider expanding the U.S. effort in Vietnam.
None of this made me anything close to an East Asian expert, however. I had never visited Indochina, nor did I undertsand or appreciate its history, language, culture, or values. The same must be said, to varying degrees, about President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, military adviser Maxwell Taylor, and many others. When it came to Vietnam, we found ourselves setting policy for a region that was terra incognita.
Worse, our government lacked experts for us to consult to compensate for our ignorance. When the Berlin crisis occurred in 1961 and during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, President Kennedy was able to turn to senior people like Llewellyn Thompson, Charles Bohlen, and George Kennan, who knew the Soviets intimately. There were no senior officials in the Pentagon or State Department with comparable knowledge about Southeast Asia. I knew of only one Pentagon officer with counterinsurgency experience in the region--Col. Edward Lansdale, who had served as an advisor to Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines and Diem in South Vietnam. But Lansdale was relatively junior and lacked broad geopolitical expertise.
The irony of this gap was that it existed largely because the top East Asian and China experts in the State Department--John Paton Davies, Jr., John Stewart Service, and John Carter Vincent [and Edmund Clubb]--had been purged during the McCarthy hysteria of the 1950s. Without men like these to provide sophisticated, nuanced insights, we--certainly I--badly misread China's objectives and mistook its bellicose rhetoric to imply a drive for regional hegemony. We also totally underestimated the nationalist aspect of Ho Chi Minh's movement. We saw him first as a Communist and only second as a Vietnamese nationalist....
Such ill-founded judgments were accepted without debate by the Kennedy Administration, as they had been by its Democratic and Republic predecessors. We failed to analyze our assumptions critically, then or later. The foundations of our decision making were gravely flawed."
Pelos vistos, e lendo aqui no blog do Dragão, até o padrinho Bill Kristol apostatou"
Publicado por josé 20:32:00